Best Management Practise For Somali Piracy Attack

1.1

(BMP) contained in this booklet is to assist ships to avoid, deter

or delay piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including the

Gulf of Aden (GoA) and the Arabian Sea area. Experience,

supported by data collected by Naval forces, shows that the

application of the recommendations contained within this

booklet can and will make a significant difference in preventing

a ship becoming a victim of piracy.

The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices

1.2

of violence against ships, her crew and cargo. This includes

armed robbery and attempts to board and take control of the

ship, wherever this may take place.

For the purposes of the BMP the term ‘piracy’ includes all acts

1.3

to the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa website

(www.mschoa.org), which provides additional and updating

advice.

Where possible, this booklet should be read with reference

1.4

the 2

published in August 2009.

This BMP3 booklet updates the guidance contained withinnd edition of the Best Management Practice document

1.5

latest IMO MSC Circulars

This booklet complements piracy guidance provided in the

IMPORTANT: The extent to which the guidance given in this booklet

is followed is always to be at the discretion of the Ship

Operator and Master.

Introduction

Section 1

2

3

Somali Pirate Activity –

The High Risk Area

Section 2

2.1

in the Gulf of Aden, concentrated on the Internationally

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), has significantly

reduced the incidents of piracy attack in this area. With Naval

forces concentrated in this area, Somali pirate activity has

been forced from the Gulf of Aden out into the Arabian Sea.

It is important to note, however, that there remains a serious

threat from piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

The significant increase in the presence of Naval forces

2.2

land and at extreme range from the Somali coast, and continue

to do so.

Somali based pirate attacks have taken place both close to

2.3

the piracy attacks have taken place. For the purposes of the

BMP, this is an

and 78°E

extreme East of this area, they have taken place at almost 70°-E

There remains the possibility that piracy attacks will take place

even further to the East of the High Risk Area. Attacks have

occurred to the extreme South of the High Risk Area. A high

state of readiness and vigilance should be maintained even

to the South of the Southerly limit of the High Risk Area and

the latest advice from MSCHOA on the extent of pirate activity

always sought (contact details are contained in Annex A).

recommended that the BMP is applied throughout the High

Risk Area

The High Risk Area for piracy attacks defines itself by wherearea bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S. While to date attacks have not been reported to theIt is.

4

5

Risk Assessment

Section 3

3.1

Masters should carry out a risk assessment to assess the

likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel,

based on the latest available information (see Annex A for

useful contacts, including MSCHOA and UKMTO). The output

of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention,

mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory

regulations with supplementary measures to combat piracy.

Factors to be considered in the risk assessment should

include, but may not be limited to, the following:

Prior to transiting the High Risk Area, Ship Operators and

3.2

the safety of the crew. Care should be taken, when formulating

measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to

the accommodation, that crew members will not be trapped

inside and should be able to escape in the event of another

type of emergency, such as, for example fire.

Crew Safety: The primary consideration should be to ensure

6

3.3

being attacked at the lowest point above the waterline, making

it easier for them to climb onboard. These points are often

on either quarter. Experience suggests that vessels with a

minimum freeboard that is greater than 8 metres have a much

greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt

than those with less. A large freeboard will provide little or no

protection if the construction of the ship provides assistance to

pirates seeking to climb onboard.

Freeboard: It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship

A large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack.

3.4

attack is by using speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or

make it difficult to board. To date, there have been no reported

attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been

proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate

tactics and techniques may develop to enable them to board

faster moving ships.

Full Sea Speed in the High Risk Area

‘Group Transit’ (see section 8.3 on page 17 for further details of

Group Transits) within the International Recommended Transit

Corridor (IRTC), speed may be required to be adjusted.

In the Gulf of Aden, ships capable of proceeding in excess

of 18 knots are strongly recommended to do so. Within the

remainder of the High Risk Area ships are reminded that

speed is extremely important in avoiding or detering a pirate

attack. It is recommended that reference should be made to

the MSCHOA website for the latest threat guidance regarding

pirate attack speed capability.

Speed: One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirateShips are recommended to proceed at. If a vessel is part of a

7

3.5

even where they are supported by larger vessels or ‘mother

ships’, which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea

states. While no statistics exist, it is likely to be more difficult to

operate these small craft effectively in sea state 3 and above.

Sea State: Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft,

3.6

immediately following the release of a hijacked vessel and/or

following a period of poor weather when pirates have been

unable to operate.

Pirate Activity: The risk of a piracy attack appears to increase

8

9

4.1

open boats or ‘skiffs’ are used in attacks, often approaching

from either quarter or the stern. Pirates appear to favour trying

to board ships from the port quarter.

Commonly, two or more small high speed (up to 25 knots)

4.2

equipment, supplies and smaller attack craft, has enabled

attacks to be undertaken at a greater range from the shore.

Pirates are also using larger long range attack craft to attack

at much greater distance from the Somali Coast.

The use of a pirate ‘mother ship’, carrying personnel,

4.3

being attacked to enable one or more armed pirates to climb

onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight ladders to

climb up the side of the vessel being attacked. Once onboard

the pirate (or pirates) will generally make their way to the

bridge to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge the

pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable

further pirates to board.

Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship

Typical Pirate Attacks

Section 4

10

4.4

many pirate attacks have taken place early in the morning,

at first light. Attacks have occurred at night, but this is less

common.

Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However,

4.5

Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in an effort to intimidate Masters

of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to

board. In what are difficult circumstances, it is very important

to maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing speed where possible,

and using careful manoeuvring to resist the attack.

It is not uncommon for pirates to use small arms fire and Rocket

4.6

crew who have planned and trained in advance of the passage

and applied the BMPs contained within this booklet.

The majority of attempted hijacks have been repelled by ship’s

11

5.1

for every ship type. Therefore, as part of the Risk Assessment,

it is important to determine which of the BMP will be most

suitable for individual ships.

Not all measures discussed in this booklet may be applicable

5.2

Naval forces. This is to ensure that Naval forces are aware

of the sea passage that a ship is about to embark upon and

how vulnerable that ship is to pirate attack. This information

is essential to enable the Naval forces to best use the assets

available to them. Once ships have commenced passage it

is important that they continue to update the Naval forces on

progress. The three key Naval organisations to contact are:

An essential part of BMP that applies to all ships is liaison with

5.2.1

is the planning and coordination authority for EU forces

(EU NAVFOR) in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia

Basin. (See contact details at Annex A.)

The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)

5.2.2

The day-to-day interface between Masters and Naval

forces is provided by UKMTO, who talk to the ships and

liaise directly with MSCHOA and the Naval commanders

at sea. UKMTO require regular updates on the position

and intended movements of ships. They use this

information to help the Naval units maintain an accurate

picture of shipping. (See contact details at Annex A). A

copy of the UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form is

attached at Annex B.

UKMTO is the first point of contact for ships in the region.

5.2.3

as a conduit for information exchange between the

Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and industry within

the region. (See contact details at Annex A).

The Martime Liaison Office Bahrain (MARLO) operates

Implementing BMP

Section 5

12

13

6.1

access to the restricted sections of the MSCHOA website

(www.mschoa.org) prior to entering the High Risk Area as it

contains additional and updated information.

It is strongly recommended that ship operators register for

6.2

Risk Area) – an area bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S and

78°E – ensure that a UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form

is sent (this can be done by either the ship or ship operator).

On entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (or High

6.3

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), ensure that a ‘Vessel

Movement Registration Form’ has been submitted to MSCHOA

(either on line, by email or by fax –see contact details at

Annex A)

4-5 days before the vessel enters the International

6.4

implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP), as required

by the

Review the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) andInternational Ship and Port Facility Security Code

(ISPS), to counter the piracy threat, including the addition of

UKMTO (as a recognised emergency response authority), as

an SSAS recipient.

6.5

a contingency plan is in place for a passage through the High

Risk Area, and that this is exercised, briefed and discussed

with the Master and the Ship Security Officer (SSO).

The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to see that

6.6

that have been promulgated (by for example Navigational

Warnings on SAT C or alerts on the MSCHOA website –

www.mschoa.org.

Be aware of any specific threats within the High Risk Areas

Company Planning

Section 6

14

6.7

recommended routeing through the High Risk Area and

available methods of transiting the IRTC (eg Group Transit

or national convoy where these exist). Reference should be

made to the MSCHOA website for the latest routeing guidance

(see contact details at Annex A).

Offer the Ship’s Master guidance with regard to the

6.8

sessions post transits.

Conduct crew training sessions prior to transits and debriefing

6.9

Protection Measures

Area is very strongly recommended. Suggested SPMs are set

out within this booklet. The use of SPMs significantly increases

the prospects of a ship resisting a pirate attack.

The provision of carefully planned and installed Self(SPMs) prior to transiting the High Risk

6.10

numbers.

Consider additional resources to enhance watch-keeping

6.11

discretion of the company, but the use of armed guards is not

recommended.

The use of additional private security guards is at the

15

Masters’ Planning

Section 7

7.1

Risk Area) – an area bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S and

78°E – ensure that a UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form

is sent (this can be done by either the ship or ship operator).

On entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (or High

7.2

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) ensure that a ‘Vessel

Movement Registration Form’ has been submitted to MSCHOA

(either online, by email or fax – see contact details at Annex A).

4-5 days before the vessel enters the Internationally

7.3

the crew should be briefed on the preparations and a drill

conducted prior to arrival in the area. The plan should be

reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including

familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack, an

all clear and the appropriate response to each.

Prior to entry into the High Risk Area it is recommended that

7.4

communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact

numbers and prepared messages, which should be ready

at hand or permanently displayed near the communications

panel (eg telephone numbers of MSCHOA, IMB, PRC, CSO

etc – see list of Contacts at Annex A).Masters are advised to also prepare an emergency