Best Management Practise For Somali Piracy Attack

1.1

(BMP) contained in this booklet is to assist ships to avoid, deter

or delay piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including the

Gulf of Aden (GoA) and the Arabian Sea area. Experience,

supported by data collected by Naval forces, shows that the

application of the recommendations contained within this

booklet can and will make a significant difference in preventing

a ship becoming a victim of piracy.

The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices

1.2

of violence against ships, her crew and cargo. This includes

armed robbery and attempts to board and take control of the

ship, wherever this may take place.

For the purposes of the BMP the term ‘piracy’ includes all acts

1.3

to the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa website

(www.mschoa.org), which provides additional and updating

advice.

Where possible, this booklet should be read with reference

1.4

the 2

published in August 2009.

This BMP3 booklet updates the guidance contained withinnd edition of the Best Management Practice document

1.5

latest IMO MSC Circulars

This booklet complements piracy guidance provided in the

IMPORTANT: The extent to which the guidance given in this booklet

is followed is always to be at the discretion of the Ship

Operator and Master.

Introduction

Section 1

2

3

Somali Pirate Activity –

The High Risk Area

Section 2

2.1

in the Gulf of Aden, concentrated on the Internationally

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), has significantly

reduced the incidents of piracy attack in this area. With Naval

forces concentrated in this area, Somali pirate activity has

been forced from the Gulf of Aden out into the Arabian Sea.

It is important to note, however, that there remains a serious

threat from piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

The significant increase in the presence of Naval forces

2.2

land and at extreme range from the Somali coast, and continue

to do so.

Somali based pirate attacks have taken place both close to

2.3

the piracy attacks have taken place. For the purposes of the

BMP, this is an

and 78°E

extreme East of this area, they have taken place at almost 70°-E

There remains the possibility that piracy attacks will take place

even further to the East of the High Risk Area. Attacks have

occurred to the extreme South of the High Risk Area. A high

state of readiness and vigilance should be maintained even

to the South of the Southerly limit of the High Risk Area and

the latest advice from MSCHOA on the extent of pirate activity

always sought (contact details are contained in Annex A).

recommended that the BMP is applied throughout the High

Risk Area

The High Risk Area for piracy attacks defines itself by wherearea bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S. While to date attacks have not been reported to theIt is.

4

5

Risk Assessment

Section 3

3.1

Masters should carry out a risk assessment to assess the

likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel,

based on the latest available information (see Annex A for

useful contacts, including MSCHOA and UKMTO). The output

of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention,

mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory

regulations with supplementary measures to combat piracy.

Factors to be considered in the risk assessment should

include, but may not be limited to, the following:

Prior to transiting the High Risk Area, Ship Operators and

3.2

the safety of the crew. Care should be taken, when formulating

measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to

the accommodation, that crew members will not be trapped

inside and should be able to escape in the event of another

type of emergency, such as, for example fire.

Crew Safety: The primary consideration should be to ensure

6

3.3

being attacked at the lowest point above the waterline, making

it easier for them to climb onboard. These points are often

on either quarter. Experience suggests that vessels with a

minimum freeboard that is greater than 8 metres have a much

greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt

than those with less. A large freeboard will provide little or no

protection if the construction of the ship provides assistance to

pirates seeking to climb onboard.

Freeboard: It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship

A large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack.

3.4

attack is by using speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or

make it difficult to board. To date, there have been no reported

attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been

proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate

tactics and techniques may develop to enable them to board

faster moving ships.

Full Sea Speed in the High Risk Area

‘Group Transit’ (see section 8.3 on page 17 for further details of

Group Transits) within the International Recommended Transit

Corridor (IRTC), speed may be required to be adjusted.

In the Gulf of Aden, ships capable of proceeding in excess

of 18 knots are strongly recommended to do so. Within the

remainder of the High Risk Area ships are reminded that

speed is extremely important in avoiding or detering a pirate

attack. It is recommended that reference should be made to

the MSCHOA website for the latest threat guidance regarding

pirate attack speed capability.

Speed: One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirateShips are recommended to proceed at. If a vessel is part of a

7

3.5

even where they are supported by larger vessels or ‘mother

ships’, which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea

states. While no statistics exist, it is likely to be more difficult to

operate these small craft effectively in sea state 3 and above.

Sea State: Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft,

3.6

immediately following the release of a hijacked vessel and/or

following a period of poor weather when pirates have been

unable to operate.

Pirate Activity: The risk of a piracy attack appears to increase

8

9

4.1

open boats or ‘skiffs’ are used in attacks, often approaching

from either quarter or the stern. Pirates appear to favour trying

to board ships from the port quarter.

Commonly, two or more small high speed (up to 25 knots)

4.2

equipment, supplies and smaller attack craft, has enabled

attacks to be undertaken at a greater range from the shore.

Pirates are also using larger long range attack craft to attack

at much greater distance from the Somali Coast.

The use of a pirate ‘mother ship’, carrying personnel,

4.3

being attacked to enable one or more armed pirates to climb

onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight ladders to

climb up the side of the vessel being attacked. Once onboard

the pirate (or pirates) will generally make their way to the

bridge to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge the

pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable

further pirates to board.

Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship

Typical Pirate Attacks

Section 4

10

4.4

many pirate attacks have taken place early in the morning,

at first light. Attacks have occurred at night, but this is less

common.

Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However,

4.5

Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in an effort to intimidate Masters

of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to

board. In what are difficult circumstances, it is very important

to maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing speed where possible,

and using careful manoeuvring to resist the attack.

It is not uncommon for pirates to use small arms fire and Rocket

4.6

crew who have planned and trained in advance of the passage

and applied the BMPs contained within this booklet.

The majority of attempted hijacks have been repelled by ship’s

11

5.1

for every ship type. Therefore, as part of the Risk Assessment,

it is important to determine which of the BMP will be most

suitable for individual ships.

Not all measures discussed in this booklet may be applicable

5.2

Naval forces. This is to ensure that Naval forces are aware

of the sea passage that a ship is about to embark upon and

how vulnerable that ship is to pirate attack. This information

is essential to enable the Naval forces to best use the assets

available to them. Once ships have commenced passage it

is important that they continue to update the Naval forces on

progress. The three key Naval organisations to contact are:

An essential part of BMP that applies to all ships is liaison with

5.2.1

is the planning and coordination authority for EU forces

(EU NAVFOR) in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia

Basin. (See contact details at Annex A.)

The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)

5.2.2

The day-to-day interface between Masters and Naval

forces is provided by UKMTO, who talk to the ships and

liaise directly with MSCHOA and the Naval commanders

at sea. UKMTO require regular updates on the position

and intended movements of ships. They use this

information to help the Naval units maintain an accurate

picture of shipping. (See contact details at Annex A). A

copy of the UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form is

attached at Annex B.

UKMTO is the first point of contact for ships in the region.

5.2.3

as a conduit for information exchange between the

Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and industry within

the region. (See contact details at Annex A).

The Martime Liaison Office Bahrain (MARLO) operates

Implementing BMP

Section 5

12

13

6.1

access to the restricted sections of the MSCHOA website

(www.mschoa.org) prior to entering the High Risk Area as it

contains additional and updated information.

It is strongly recommended that ship operators register for

6.2

Risk Area) – an area bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S and

78°E – ensure that a UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form

is sent (this can be done by either the ship or ship operator).

On entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (or High

6.3

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), ensure that a ‘Vessel

Movement Registration Form’ has been submitted to MSCHOA

(either on line, by email or by fax –see contact details at

Annex A)

4-5 days before the vessel enters the International

6.4

implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP), as required

by the

Review the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) andInternational Ship and Port Facility Security Code

(ISPS), to counter the piracy threat, including the addition of

UKMTO (as a recognised emergency response authority), as

an SSAS recipient.

6.5

a contingency plan is in place for a passage through the High

Risk Area, and that this is exercised, briefed and discussed

with the Master and the Ship Security Officer (SSO).

The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to see that

6.6

that have been promulgated (by for example Navigational

Warnings on SAT C or alerts on the MSCHOA website –

www.mschoa.org.

Be aware of any specific threats within the High Risk Areas

Company Planning

Section 6

14

6.7

recommended routeing through the High Risk Area and

available methods of transiting the IRTC (eg Group Transit

or national convoy where these exist). Reference should be

made to the MSCHOA website for the latest routeing guidance

(see contact details at Annex A).

Offer the Ship’s Master guidance with regard to the

6.8

sessions post transits.

Conduct crew training sessions prior to transits and debriefing

6.9

Protection Measures

Area is very strongly recommended. Suggested SPMs are set

out within this booklet. The use of SPMs significantly increases

the prospects of a ship resisting a pirate attack.

The provision of carefully planned and installed Self(SPMs) prior to transiting the High Risk

6.10

numbers.

Consider additional resources to enhance watch-keeping

6.11

discretion of the company, but the use of armed guards is not

recommended.

The use of additional private security guards is at the

15

Masters’ Planning

Section 7

7.1

Risk Area) – an area bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S and

78°E – ensure that a UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form

is sent (this can be done by either the ship or ship operator).

On entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (or High

7.2

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) ensure that a ‘Vessel

Movement Registration Form’ has been submitted to MSCHOA

(either online, by email or fax – see contact details at Annex A).

4-5 days before the vessel enters the Internationally

7.3

the crew should be briefed on the preparations and a drill

conducted prior to arrival in the area. The plan should be

reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including

familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack, an

all clear and the appropriate response to each.

Prior to entry into the High Risk Area it is recommended that

7.4

communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact

numbers and prepared messages, which should be ready

at hand or permanently displayed near the communications

panel (eg telephone numbers of MSCHOA, IMB, PRC, CSO

etc – see list of Contacts at Annex A).Masters are advised to also prepare an emergency

Guidelines on Early assesment of Hull Damage and Possible need for abandonment of Bulk Carriers

GUIDELINES ON EARLY ASSESSMENT OF HULL DAMAGE AND

POSSIBLE NEED FOR ABANDONMENT OF BULK CARRIERS

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-sixth session (2 to 13 December 2002),

considered recommendations for decision-making emanating from various formal safety assessment

(FSA) studies on bulk carrier safety. In particular, the Committee agreed that a circular should be

prepared addressing bulk carriers which may not withstand flooding of any one cargo hold and

containing information on the action to be taken in case of flooding of such holds, making sure that

the professional judgement of the master is not undermined.

2 The Committee, at its seventy-ninth session (1 to 10 December 2004), having considered the

recommendations made by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment at its forty-sixth

session, the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation at its forty-ninth and fiftieth sessions and the

Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping at its thirty-fifth session, approved

Guidelines on early assessment of hull damage and possible need for abandonment of bulk carriers,

as set out in the annex. Some common causes of hull damage are contained in the Appendix to the

annex.

3 Member Governments are invited to urge companies, as defined in the ISM Code, that

operate bulk carriers flying their flag, to issue ship specific guidance, based on the annexed

Guidelines, to the masters of such bulk carriers with a view to improving the precautionary measures

and procedures for emergencies on board their ships. This ship specific guidance should be brought

to the attention of all crew members during familiarization training.

***

MSC/Circ.1143

I:\CIRC\MSC\1143.DOC

ANNEX

GUIDELINES ON EARLY ASSESSMENT OF HULL DAMAGE AND

POSSIBLE NEED FOR ABANDONMENT OF BULK CARRIERS

1 Provoked by the disappearance and loss of a number of bulk carriers from mid 1970s

onwards the international shipping community has grown increasingly concerned that such ships are

particularly vulnerable to rapid loss. Consequently, IMO has been taking action over the years to

address this problem and to find appropriate solutions. Among such actions, the Organization has

adopted amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, by introducing chapter XII in 1997 (amended

in 2002), and other related provisions in chapter II-1, and has also amended the Guidelines on the

enhanced programme of inspections during surveys of bulk carriers and oil tankers

(resolution A.744(18)) on several occasions. More recently, a number of formal safety assessment

(FSA) studies on bulk carrier safety have been carried out. From these studies, the Maritime Safety

Committee of IMO concluded at its seventy-sixth session in December 2002 that bulk carriers do

deserve continued special attention and a number of measures were approved to address the issues

identified, both structural and operational.

2 Records of bulk carrier losses indicated, in a large proportion of the cases studied, that ship.s

masters often appeared to be unaware of the imminent danger they were in. Many lost their lives

together with the other seafarers on board as a consequence. Ship losses were frequently so rapid

that the ship did not have time to send a distress signal.

3 The records studied show that in the event of loss of hull integrity, in many cases, bulk

carriers should be evacuated as quickly as possible. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE, COMBINED WITH ALERTING A MARITIME RESCUE

CO-ORDINATION CENTRE, ALERTING ALL PERSONNEL ONBOARD AND MAKING

PREPARATIONS FOR EVACUATION. This is of particular importance for single skin bulk

carriers which may not be capable of withstanding flooding of any cargo hold.

4 Companies should consider the following advice carefully with a view to improving their

own precautionary measures and procedures for emergencies. The advice applies equally to ships

other than bulk carriers when carrying dense cargoes.

Heavy cargoes

5 In most cases in which bulk carriers have been lost, heavy cargoes such as iron and other

dense ores are a common factor. Ships are also vulnerable when carrying certain break-bulk cargoes

such as steel products. This could include other ship types. The small volume taken up by the cargo

in the ships. holds results in a large unoccupied space. This provides potential in a flooding scenario

for large volumes of water to rapidly destroy the ship.s residual buoyancy and, in the case of smaller

vessels, its stability. Larger vessels are also highly susceptible to structural failure due to increases

of weights caused by the influx of water.

6 Heavy cargoes place high loads on the structure, and structural failure is therefore more

probable when subjected to the additional forces associated with flooding.

MSC/Circ.1143

ANNEX

Page 2

I:\CIRC\MSC\1143.DOC

Structure

7 Deterioration of structure through corrosion, fatigue and damage is identified as a principal

factor in the loss of many bulk carriers. Failing to identify such deterioration may lead to sudden and

unexpected failure. Bulk carrier crews may be unaware of the vulnerability of these vessel types.

The consequential loss of a ship carrying heavy cargo can be expected to be very rapid, should a

major failure occur.

Forward flooding

8 Spaces forward of the collision bulkhead will, in the event of flooding, significantly affect the

trim of the ship and reduce freeboard at the bow. In extreme weather this further threatens the ship

as green seas come inboard and impact on hatch covers and other fittings that protect the water or

weathertight integrity of the ship. Shell plating in the region of the bow protects the fore peak tank

and other spaces as do air pipes and ventilators. If any of them are damaged the ship.s ability to

resist further escalation of flooding is compromised.

Early assessment

9 When it occurs or is likely to occur, masters should quickly assess damage to their ships by

being alert to water ingress and its consequences. The following guidelines are given to assist them

in this assessment.

Unusual motion or attitude

10 If a ship takes on an unusual trim or heel, or if her motions become changed, breach of the

hull envelope should be suspected immediately:

- Unusual collections of water on decks may be indicating trim or heel abnormality.

- Sudden changes of heel or trim will indicate flooding or in smaller ships with lighter

cargoes it may indicate cargo shift.

- Jerky lateral motions can be indicative of large scale sloshing as would be the case if a

hold were flooded.

- On smaller ships, slowing of the ship.s roll period may indicate excessive water within

the hull - a serious threat to stability. Ships fitted with GM meters should be able to

identify any unexpected changes in GM.

- Increases of water boarding forward decks may indicate flooding of a forward

compartment. Trim and freeboard changes are notoriously difficult to assess from an

after bridge.

11

Methods of detection

- Hatch covers may be dislodged by pressure and/or sloshing from within a hold if

flooding occurs through side shell or bulkhead.

"ship security Incident"

Taken From Malaysian Shipping Act (Amendment and Extension 2007)

“security incident” means any suspicious act or

circumstance threatening the security of a ship, including

a high-speed craft, or a marine facility, or any shipmarine

facility interface or ship-to-ship activity;

“security level” means the quantification of the degree

of risk that a security incident will be attempted or will

occur;

“security level 1” means the level for which minimum

appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained

at all times;

“security level 2” means the level for which appropriate

additional protective security measures shall be maintained

for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a

security incident;

“security level 3” means the level for which further

specific protective security measures shall be maintained

for a limited period of time when a security incident is

probable or imminent, although it may not be possible

to identify the specific target;

A 23 /Res 949 -Port Og Refuge

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

E
IMO

ASSEMBLY A 23/Res.949
23rd session 5 March 2004Agenda item 17 Original: ENGLISH
Resolution A.949(23)
Adopted on 5 December 2003
(Agenda item 17)
GUIDELINES ON PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS 
IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE
THE ASSEMBLY,
RECALLING Article 15(j) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization
concerning the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations and guidelines concerning
maritime safety and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,
RECALLING ALSO the obligations and procedures for the master to come to the
assistance of persons in distress at sea, established by regulation V/33 of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended,
RECALLING FURTHER that the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue, 1979, as amended, establishes a comprehensive system for the rescue of persons in
distress at sea which does not address the issue of ships in need of assistance,
CONSCIOUS OF THE POSSIBILITY that ships at sea may find themselves in need of
assistance relating to the safety of life and the protection of the marine environment,
RECOGNIZING the importance of and need for providing guidance for the masters
and/or salvors of ships in need of assistance,
RECOGNIZING ALSO the need to balance both the prerogative of a ship in need of
assistance to seek a place of refuge and the prerogative of a coastal State to protect its coastline,
RECOGNIZING FURTHER that the provision of a common framework to assist coastal
States to determine places of refuge for ships in need of assistance and respond effectively to
requests for such places of refuge would materially enhance maritime safety and the protection of
the marine environment,
HAVING CONSIDERED the recommendations made by the Maritime Safety Committee
at its seventy-sixth and seventy-seventh sessions, by the Marine Environment Protection
Committee at its forty-eighth session, by the Legal Committee at its eighty-seventh session and
by the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation at its forty-ninth session,
For reasons of economy, this document is printed in a limited number. Delegates are
kindly asked to bring their copies to meetings and not to request additional copies.
I:\ASSEMBLY\23\RES\949.doc


A 23/Res.949 - 2 -

1. ADOPTS the Guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance, the text of
which is set out in the annex to the present resolution;
2. INVITES Governments to take these Guidelines into account when determining and
responding to requests for places of refuge from ships in need of assistance;
3. REQUESTS the Maritime Safety Committee, the Marine Environment Protection
Committee and the Legal Committee to keep the annexed Guidelines under review and amend
them as appropriate;
4. REQUESTS the Legal Committee to consider, as a matter of priority, the said Guidelines
from its own perspective, including the provision of financial security to cover coastal State
expenses and/or compensation issues, and to take action as it may deem appropriate.
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-3 -
A 23/Res.949
ANNEX
GUIDELINES ON PLACES OF REFUGE FOR SHIPS
IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE

Table of Contents

A 23/Res.949 - 4 -
1 General
Introduction
Objectives of providing a place of refuge
1.1 Where the safety of life is involved, the provisions of the SAR Convention should be
followed. Where a ship is in need of assistance but safety of life is not involved, these guidelines
should be followed.
1.2 The issue of .places of refuge. is not a purely theoretical or doctrinal debate but the
solution to a practical problem: What to do when a ship finds itself in serious difficulty or in need
of assistance without, however, presenting a risk to the safety of life of persons involved. Should
the ship be brought into shelter near the coast or into a port or, conversely, should it be taken out
to sea?
1.3 When a ship has suffered an incident, the best way of preventing damage or pollution
from its progressive deterioration would be to lighten its cargo and bunkers; and to repair the
damage. Such an operation is best carried out in a place of refuge.
1.4 However, to bring such a ship into a place of refuge near a coast may endanger the coastal
State, both economically and from the environmental point of view, and local authorities and
populations may strongly object to the operation.
1.5 While coastal States may be reluctant to accept damaged or disabled ships into their area
of responsibility due primarily to the potential for environmental damage, in fact it is rarely
possible to deal satisfactorily and effectively with a marine casualty in open sea conditions.
1.6 In some circumstances, the longer a damaged ship is forced to remain at the mercy of the
elements in the open sea, the greater the risk of the vessel.s condition deteriorating or the sea,
weather or environmental situation changing and thereby becoming a greater potential hazard.
1.7 Therefore, granting access to a place of refuge could involve a political decision which
can only be taken on a case-by-case basis with due consideration given to the balance between
the advantage for the affected ship and the environment resulting from bringing the ship into a
place of refuge and the risk to the environment resulting from that ship being near the coast.
Background
1.8 There are circumstances under which it may be desirable to carry out a cargo transfer
operation or other operations to prevent or minimize damage or pollution. For this purpose, it
will usually be advantageous to take the ship to a place of refuge.
1.9 Taking such a ship to a place of refuge would also have the advantage of limiting the
extent of coastline threatened by damage or pollution, but the specific area chosen may be more
severely threatened. Consideration must also be given to the possibility of taking the affected
ship to a port or terminal where the transfer or repair work could be done relatively easily. For
this reason the decision on the choice and use of a place of refuge will have to be carefully
considered.
I:\ASSEMBLY\23\RES\949.doc


-5 -
A 23/Res.949
1.10 The use of places of refuge could encounter local opposition and involve political
decisions. The coastal States should recognize that a properly argued technical case, based on a
clear description of the state of the casualty, would be of great value in any negotiations which
may take place.
1.11 At the international level, the Conventions listed in Appendix 1, as may be amended,
constitute, inter alia, the legal context within which coastal States and ships act in the envisaged
circumstances.
Purpose of the Guidelines
1.12 The purpose of these Guidelines is to provide Member Governments, shipmasters,
companies1 (particularly in connection with the ISM Code and procedures arising therefrom),
and salvors with a framework enabling them to respond effectively and in such a way that, in any
given situation, the efforts of the shipmaster and shipping company concerned and the efforts of
the government authorities involved are complementary. In particular, an attempt has been made
to arrive at a common framework for assessing the situation of ships in need of assistance.
1.13 These Guidelines do not address the issue of operations for the rescue of persons at
sea, inasmuch as the practical difficulties that have given rise to the examination of the issue of
places of refuge relate to problems other than those of rescue. Two situations can arise:
-
the ship, according to the master.s assessment, is in need of assistance but not in a
distress situation (about to sink, fire developing, etc.) that requires the evacuation
of those on board; or
-
those on board have already been rescued, with the possible exception of those
who have stayed on board or have been placed on board in an attempt to deal with
the situation of the ship.
1.14 If, however, in an evolving situation, the persons on board find themselves in
distress, the rules applicable to rescue operations under the SAR Convention, the IAMSAR
Manual and documents arising therefrom have priority over the present Guidelines (and
procedures arising herefrom).
1.15 In any case the competent MRCC should be informed about any situation which may
develop into a SAR incident.
1.16 Even though a .rescue. operation, as defined in the International Convention on Maritime
Search and Rescue (SAR) is not the case, the safety of persons must nevertheless be constantly
borne in mind in the application of these Guidelines, particularly in two respects:
-
if the ship poses a risk (explosion, serious pollution, etc.) to the life of persons in
the vicinity (crews of salvage vessels, port workers, inhabitants of the coastal area,
etc.);
-
if persons voluntarily stay (master, etc.) or go (fire-fighters and other experts,
personnel of marine salvage or towage companies, etc.) on board to attempt to
overcome the difficulties experienced by the ship.
1 As defined in the ISM Code.
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A 23/Res.949
- 6 -