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UNCLOS 1982

Introduction

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the most comprehensive attempt at creating a unified regime for governance of the rights of nations with respect to the world's oceans. The treaty addresses a number of topics including navigational rights, economic rights, pollution of the seas, conservation of marine life, scientific exploration, piracy, and more. The treaty, one of the longest in history, is comprised of 320 articles and 9 annexes, representing the codification of customary international law and its progressive development.

Historical Background

Since humanity first set forth upon the seas, the issue of sovereign control over the oceans has been an ongoing concern. Prior to the 20th century, the oceans had been subject to the freedom of the seas doctrine. This principle, adopted in the 17th century, limited national rights and jurisdiction over a narrow band of water along a nations coast, the rest of the sea being free to all and belonging to none. Nearly a century later, the "cannon-shot" rule became the basis for determining how much of the adjacent oceans were under the jurisdiction of a nation. The cannon-shot rule set forth that a nation controlled a territorial sea as far as a projectile could be fired from a cannon based on shore. In the 18th century this range was approximate three nautical miles. As time progressed, three miles became the widely accepted range for the territorial sea.^[1]
Due to the slow pace of technological developments prior to the Industrial Revolution, these simple rules provided effective governance of the world's oceans. With the technological developments of the mid-19th and early-20th centuries, however, not only did ships become more powerful, but technology allowed humanity to exploit ocean resources that had never before been envisioned. Fishermen, once limited to areas near their own coasts, were now equipped with vessels that could allow them to stay at sea for months at a time and capture fish harvests that were far from their native waters. Virtually unrestrained, fleets from around the world traveled to areas rich in fish-stocks. The lack of restraint on the part of these fishermen resulted in fish stocks around the world being depleted without regard to the stability of their numbers.^[2]
Evolving technology also allowed for the exploitation of previously inaccessible off-shore resources, most notably oil (but also diamonds, gravel, and precious metals). To illustrate the rapidity of these developments, in 1947 off-shore oil production in the Gulf of Mexico was still less than 1 million tons. By 1954, production had grown close to 400 million tons.^[3] As a matter of perspective, just in the Gulf of Mexico, the United States alone currently produces 218,192 tons daily, for a total of 79.6 million tons annually, reflecting a steadily decreasing trend that began in the 1970's.^[4]

In order to protect local resources, be they biological or mineral, nations began expanding their claims of sovereignty beyond the traditional 3 mile limit. The first nation to challenge the long-standing freedom of the seas doctrine was the United States. On September 28, 1945, President Harry S. Truman signed what has become commonly known as the Truman Proclamation. The proclamation set a claim of sovereignty by the United States to the outer continental shelf (OCS) and the resources therein as well as establishing the right of the U.S. to establish conservations zones "in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States."^[5] While recognizing some limited sovereignty over an expanded region of the sea, the proclamation was careful to stipulate that the new US policy did not affect "the right [of] free and unimpeded navigation."^[6]
After the United States expanded its claim, it was not long before other nations followed suit. By 1950, Argentina was actively claiming its continental shelf as well as the water column above it, Ecuador, Chile, and Peru were asserting rights over a 200-mile zone in order to protect its biological resources from foreign fleets, and a spate of Arab and Eastern European nations were laying claim to a 12-mile territorial sea. There was a growing understanding, however, that such a fractured regime could not continue.<sup>[7]
For further information pls click below link:-

UNCLOS 1982</sup>

MLC 2006

MARITIME LABOUR CONVENTION 2006
An ILO cinvention which consolidates in the document up to date standard of various older ILO Maritime Convention .


http://www.dnv.com/binaries/6.1%20MLC%202006%20convention%20text_tcm4-273727.pdf

What is Demurage ,Despatch and Deadfreight

Demurage
The money payable to the owner for delay for which the owner is not responsible in loading and or/discharging after the laytime has expired.

Despatch
The money payable by the owner if ship complete loading or discharging before the laytime has expired .

Deadfreight
This term is applied to the sum of payable to the shipowner when the charter has failed to load a full and complete cargo in accordance with the provision of the contract .

Best Management Practise For Somali Piracy Attack

1.1

(BMP) contained in this booklet is to assist ships to avoid, deter

or delay piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, including the

Gulf of Aden (GoA) and the Arabian Sea area. Experience,

supported by data collected by Naval forces, shows that the

application of the recommendations contained within this

booklet can and will make a significant difference in preventing

a ship becoming a victim of piracy.

The purpose of the Industry Best Management Practices

1.2

of violence against ships, her crew and cargo. This includes

armed robbery and attempts to board and take control of the

ship, wherever this may take place.

For the purposes of the BMP the term ‘piracy’ includes all acts

1.3

to the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa website

(www.mschoa.org), which provides additional and updating

advice.

Where possible, this booklet should be read with reference

1.4

the 2

published in August 2009.

This BMP3 booklet updates the guidance contained withinnd edition of the Best Management Practice document

1.5

latest IMO MSC Circulars

This booklet complements piracy guidance provided in the

IMPORTANT: The extent to which the guidance given in this booklet

is followed is always to be at the discretion of the Ship

Operator and Master.

Introduction

Section 1

2

3

Somali Pirate Activity –

The High Risk Area

Section 2

2.1

in the Gulf of Aden, concentrated on the Internationally

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), has significantly

reduced the incidents of piracy attack in this area. With Naval

forces concentrated in this area, Somali pirate activity has

been forced from the Gulf of Aden out into the Arabian Sea.

It is important to note, however, that there remains a serious

threat from piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

The significant increase in the presence of Naval forces

2.2

land and at extreme range from the Somali coast, and continue

to do so.

Somali based pirate attacks have taken place both close to

2.3

the piracy attacks have taken place. For the purposes of the

BMP, this is an

and 78°E

extreme East of this area, they have taken place at almost 70°-E

There remains the possibility that piracy attacks will take place

even further to the East of the High Risk Area. Attacks have

occurred to the extreme South of the High Risk Area. A high

state of readiness and vigilance should be maintained even

to the South of the Southerly limit of the High Risk Area and

the latest advice from MSCHOA on the extent of pirate activity

always sought (contact details are contained in Annex A).

recommended that the BMP is applied throughout the High

Risk Area

The High Risk Area for piracy attacks defines itself by wherearea bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S. While to date attacks have not been reported to theIt is.

4

5

Risk Assessment

Section 3

3.1

Masters should carry out a risk assessment to assess the

likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel,

based on the latest available information (see Annex A for

useful contacts, including MSCHOA and UKMTO). The output

of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention,

mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory

regulations with supplementary measures to combat piracy.

Factors to be considered in the risk assessment should

include, but may not be limited to, the following:

Prior to transiting the High Risk Area, Ship Operators and

3.2

the safety of the crew. Care should be taken, when formulating

measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to

the accommodation, that crew members will not be trapped

inside and should be able to escape in the event of another

type of emergency, such as, for example fire.

Crew Safety: The primary consideration should be to ensure

6

3.3

being attacked at the lowest point above the waterline, making

it easier for them to climb onboard. These points are often

on either quarter. Experience suggests that vessels with a

minimum freeboard that is greater than 8 metres have a much

greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt

than those with less. A large freeboard will provide little or no

protection if the construction of the ship provides assistance to

pirates seeking to climb onboard.

Freeboard: It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship

A large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack.

3.4

attack is by using speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or

make it difficult to board. To date, there have been no reported

attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been

proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate

tactics and techniques may develop to enable them to board

faster moving ships.

Full Sea Speed in the High Risk Area

‘Group Transit’ (see section 8.3 on page 17 for further details of

Group Transits) within the International Recommended Transit

Corridor (IRTC), speed may be required to be adjusted.

In the Gulf of Aden, ships capable of proceeding in excess

of 18 knots are strongly recommended to do so. Within the

remainder of the High Risk Area ships are reminded that

speed is extremely important in avoiding or detering a pirate

attack. It is recommended that reference should be made to

the MSCHOA website for the latest threat guidance regarding

pirate attack speed capability.

Speed: One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirateShips are recommended to proceed at. If a vessel is part of a

7

3.5

even where they are supported by larger vessels or ‘mother

ships’, which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea

states. While no statistics exist, it is likely to be more difficult to

operate these small craft effectively in sea state 3 and above.

Sea State: Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft,

3.6

immediately following the release of a hijacked vessel and/or

following a period of poor weather when pirates have been

unable to operate.

Pirate Activity: The risk of a piracy attack appears to increase

8

9

4.1

open boats or ‘skiffs’ are used in attacks, often approaching

from either quarter or the stern. Pirates appear to favour trying

to board ships from the port quarter.

Commonly, two or more small high speed (up to 25 knots)

4.2

equipment, supplies and smaller attack craft, has enabled

attacks to be undertaken at a greater range from the shore.

Pirates are also using larger long range attack craft to attack

at much greater distance from the Somali Coast.

The use of a pirate ‘mother ship’, carrying personnel,

4.3

being attacked to enable one or more armed pirates to climb

onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight ladders to

climb up the side of the vessel being attacked. Once onboard

the pirate (or pirates) will generally make their way to the

bridge to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge the

pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable

further pirates to board.

Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship

Typical Pirate Attacks

Section 4

10

4.4

many pirate attacks have taken place early in the morning,

at first light. Attacks have occurred at night, but this is less

common.

Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However,

4.5

Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in an effort to intimidate Masters

of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to

board. In what are difficult circumstances, it is very important

to maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing speed where possible,

and using careful manoeuvring to resist the attack.

It is not uncommon for pirates to use small arms fire and Rocket

4.6

crew who have planned and trained in advance of the passage

and applied the BMPs contained within this booklet.

The majority of attempted hijacks have been repelled by ship’s

11

5.1

for every ship type. Therefore, as part of the Risk Assessment,

it is important to determine which of the BMP will be most

suitable for individual ships.

Not all measures discussed in this booklet may be applicable

5.2

Naval forces. This is to ensure that Naval forces are aware

of the sea passage that a ship is about to embark upon and

how vulnerable that ship is to pirate attack. This information

is essential to enable the Naval forces to best use the assets

available to them. Once ships have commenced passage it

is important that they continue to update the Naval forces on

progress. The three key Naval organisations to contact are:

An essential part of BMP that applies to all ships is liaison with

5.2.1

is the planning and coordination authority for EU forces

(EU NAVFOR) in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia

Basin. (See contact details at Annex A.)

The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)

5.2.2

The day-to-day interface between Masters and Naval

forces is provided by UKMTO, who talk to the ships and

liaise directly with MSCHOA and the Naval commanders

at sea. UKMTO require regular updates on the position

and intended movements of ships. They use this

information to help the Naval units maintain an accurate

picture of shipping. (See contact details at Annex A). A

copy of the UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form is

attached at Annex B.

UKMTO is the first point of contact for ships in the region.

5.2.3

as a conduit for information exchange between the

Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and industry within

the region. (See contact details at Annex A).

The Martime Liaison Office Bahrain (MARLO) operates

Implementing BMP

Section 5

12

13

6.1

access to the restricted sections of the MSCHOA website

(www.mschoa.org) prior to entering the High Risk Area as it

contains additional and updated information.

It is strongly recommended that ship operators register for

6.2

Risk Area) – an area bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S and

78°E – ensure that a UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form

is sent (this can be done by either the ship or ship operator).

On entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (or High

6.3

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), ensure that a ‘Vessel

Movement Registration Form’ has been submitted to MSCHOA

(either on line, by email or by fax –see contact details at

Annex A)

4-5 days before the vessel enters the International

6.4

implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP), as required

by the

Review the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) andInternational Ship and Port Facility Security Code

(ISPS), to counter the piracy threat, including the addition of

UKMTO (as a recognised emergency response authority), as

an SSAS recipient.

6.5

a contingency plan is in place for a passage through the High

Risk Area, and that this is exercised, briefed and discussed

with the Master and the Ship Security Officer (SSO).

The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to see that

6.6

that have been promulgated (by for example Navigational

Warnings on SAT C or alerts on the MSCHOA website –

www.mschoa.org.

Be aware of any specific threats within the High Risk Areas

Company Planning

Section 6

14

6.7

recommended routeing through the High Risk Area and

available methods of transiting the IRTC (eg Group Transit

or national convoy where these exist). Reference should be

made to the MSCHOA website for the latest routeing guidance

(see contact details at Annex A).

Offer the Ship’s Master guidance with regard to the

6.8

sessions post transits.

Conduct crew training sessions prior to transits and debriefing

6.9

Protection Measures

Area is very strongly recommended. Suggested SPMs are set

out within this booklet. The use of SPMs significantly increases

the prospects of a ship resisting a pirate attack.

The provision of carefully planned and installed Self(SPMs) prior to transiting the High Risk

6.10

numbers.

Consider additional resources to enhance watch-keeping

6.11

discretion of the company, but the use of armed guards is not

recommended.

The use of additional private security guards is at the

15

Masters’ Planning

Section 7

7.1

Risk Area) – an area bounded by Suez to the North, 10°S and

78°E – ensure that a UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form

is sent (this can be done by either the ship or ship operator).

On entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (or High

7.2

Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) ensure that a ‘Vessel

Movement Registration Form’ has been submitted to MSCHOA

(either online, by email or fax – see contact details at Annex A).

4-5 days before the vessel enters the Internationally

7.3

the crew should be briefed on the preparations and a drill

conducted prior to arrival in the area. The plan should be

reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including

familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack, an

all clear and the appropriate response to each.

Prior to entry into the High Risk Area it is recommended that

7.4

communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact

numbers and prepared messages, which should be ready

at hand or permanently displayed near the communications

panel (eg telephone numbers of MSCHOA, IMB, PRC, CSO

etc – see list of Contacts at Annex A).Masters are advised to also prepare an emergency

Guidelines on Early assesment of Hull Damage and Possible need for abandonment of Bulk Carriers

GUIDELINES ON EARLY ASSESSMENT OF HULL DAMAGE AND

POSSIBLE NEED FOR ABANDONMENT OF BULK CARRIERS

1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its seventy-sixth session (2 to 13 December 2002),

considered recommendations for decision-making emanating from various formal safety assessment

(FSA) studies on bulk carrier safety. In particular, the Committee agreed that a circular should be

prepared addressing bulk carriers which may not withstand flooding of any one cargo hold and

containing information on the action to be taken in case of flooding of such holds, making sure that

the professional judgement of the master is not undermined.

2 The Committee, at its seventy-ninth session (1 to 10 December 2004), having considered the

recommendations made by the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment at its forty-sixth

session, the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation at its forty-ninth and fiftieth sessions and the

Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping at its thirty-fifth session, approved

Guidelines on early assessment of hull damage and possible need for abandonment of bulk carriers,

as set out in the annex. Some common causes of hull damage are contained in the Appendix to the

annex.

3 Member Governments are invited to urge companies, as defined in the ISM Code, that

operate bulk carriers flying their flag, to issue ship specific guidance, based on the annexed

Guidelines, to the masters of such bulk carriers with a view to improving the precautionary measures

and procedures for emergencies on board their ships. This ship specific guidance should be brought

to the attention of all crew members during familiarization training.

***

MSC/Circ.1143

I:\CIRC\MSC\1143.DOC

ANNEX

GUIDELINES ON EARLY ASSESSMENT OF HULL DAMAGE AND

POSSIBLE NEED FOR ABANDONMENT OF BULK CARRIERS

1 Provoked by the disappearance and loss of a number of bulk carriers from mid 1970s

onwards the international shipping community has grown increasingly concerned that such ships are

particularly vulnerable to rapid loss. Consequently, IMO has been taking action over the years to

address this problem and to find appropriate solutions. Among such actions, the Organization has

adopted amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, by introducing chapter XII in 1997 (amended

in 2002), and other related provisions in chapter II-1, and has also amended the Guidelines on the

enhanced programme of inspections during surveys of bulk carriers and oil tankers

(resolution A.744(18)) on several occasions. More recently, a number of formal safety assessment

(FSA) studies on bulk carrier safety have been carried out. From these studies, the Maritime Safety

Committee of IMO concluded at its seventy-sixth session in December 2002 that bulk carriers do

deserve continued special attention and a number of measures were approved to address the issues

identified, both structural and operational.

2 Records of bulk carrier losses indicated, in a large proportion of the cases studied, that ship.s

masters often appeared to be unaware of the imminent danger they were in. Many lost their lives

together with the other seafarers on board as a consequence. Ship losses were frequently so rapid

that the ship did not have time to send a distress signal.

3 The records studied show that in the event of loss of hull integrity, in many cases, bulk

carriers should be evacuated as quickly as possible. EARLY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE, COMBINED WITH ALERTING A MARITIME RESCUE

CO-ORDINATION CENTRE, ALERTING ALL PERSONNEL ONBOARD AND MAKING

PREPARATIONS FOR EVACUATION. This is of particular importance for single skin bulk

carriers which may not be capable of withstanding flooding of any cargo hold.

4 Companies should consider the following advice carefully with a view to improving their

own precautionary measures and procedures for emergencies. The advice applies equally to ships

other than bulk carriers when carrying dense cargoes.

Heavy cargoes

5 In most cases in which bulk carriers have been lost, heavy cargoes such as iron and other

dense ores are a common factor. Ships are also vulnerable when carrying certain break-bulk cargoes

such as steel products. This could include other ship types. The small volume taken up by the cargo

in the ships. holds results in a large unoccupied space. This provides potential in a flooding scenario

for large volumes of water to rapidly destroy the ship.s residual buoyancy and, in the case of smaller

vessels, its stability. Larger vessels are also highly susceptible to structural failure due to increases

of weights caused by the influx of water.

6 Heavy cargoes place high loads on the structure, and structural failure is therefore more

probable when subjected to the additional forces associated with flooding.

MSC/Circ.1143

ANNEX

Page 2

I:\CIRC\MSC\1143.DOC

Structure

7 Deterioration of structure through corrosion, fatigue and damage is identified as a principal

factor in the loss of many bulk carriers. Failing to identify such deterioration may lead to sudden and

unexpected failure. Bulk carrier crews may be unaware of the vulnerability of these vessel types.

The consequential loss of a ship carrying heavy cargo can be expected to be very rapid, should a

major failure occur.

Forward flooding

8 Spaces forward of the collision bulkhead will, in the event of flooding, significantly affect the

trim of the ship and reduce freeboard at the bow. In extreme weather this further threatens the ship

as green seas come inboard and impact on hatch covers and other fittings that protect the water or

weathertight integrity of the ship. Shell plating in the region of the bow protects the fore peak tank

and other spaces as do air pipes and ventilators. If any of them are damaged the ship.s ability to

resist further escalation of flooding is compromised.

Early assessment

9 When it occurs or is likely to occur, masters should quickly assess damage to their ships by

being alert to water ingress and its consequences. The following guidelines are given to assist them

in this assessment.

Unusual motion or attitude

10 If a ship takes on an unusual trim or heel, or if her motions become changed, breach of the

hull envelope should be suspected immediately:

- Unusual collections of water on decks may be indicating trim or heel abnormality.

- Sudden changes of heel or trim will indicate flooding or in smaller ships with lighter

cargoes it may indicate cargo shift.

- Jerky lateral motions can be indicative of large scale sloshing as would be the case if a

hold were flooded.

- On smaller ships, slowing of the ship.s roll period may indicate excessive water within

the hull - a serious threat to stability. Ships fitted with GM meters should be able to

identify any unexpected changes in GM.

- Increases of water boarding forward decks may indicate flooding of a forward

compartment. Trim and freeboard changes are notoriously difficult to assess from an

after bridge.

11

Methods of detection

- Hatch covers may be dislodged by pressure and/or sloshing from within a hold if

flooding occurs through side shell or bulkhead.

"ship security Incident"

Taken From Malaysian Shipping Act (Amendment and Extension 2007)

“security incident” means any suspicious act or

circumstance threatening the security of a ship, including

a high-speed craft, or a marine facility, or any shipmarine

facility interface or ship-to-ship activity;

“security level” means the quantification of the degree

of risk that a security incident will be attempted or will

occur;

“security level 1” means the level for which minimum

appropriate protective security measures shall be maintained

at all times;

“security level 2” means the level for which appropriate

additional protective security measures shall be maintained

for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a

security incident;

“security level 3” means the level for which further

specific protective security measures shall be maintained

for a limited period of time when a security incident is

probable or imminent, although it may not be possible

to identify the specific target;